

Guilty as Charged? Subjectivity and the Law in *La Chanson de Roland* and "Lanval"**Katherine Kong**

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La Chanson de Roland and Marie de France's *lai* "Lanval," both seminal French texts of the twelfth century, touch on aspects of legitimacy, legality and the power of the sovereign. As such, they provide excellent opportunities for exploring the bounds of subjectivity in the law, especially in their trial scenes. In examining the figures of Ganelon, "who has committed treason,"¹ and Lanval, "accused of felony, but also of lying,"² one sees two roles developing: that of traitor and that of felon, identities delimited by transgression of the king's law. I will examine these categories of traitor and felon more closely, and read the scenes of trial in *La Chanson de Roland* and "Lanval" with the following questions in mind: how are guilt and crime configured, and what are the implications of these formulations for medieval subjectivity? What does it mean to be outside of the law, and what kind of subject position might this enable? More to the point, how does literature imagine this subject position? These questions give rise to an exploration of an individual subjectivity, how one comes to bear guilt, and even an identity and subjectivity under the law of the sovereign. I propose to examine the relationship between an individual and a culpable subjectivity created by the legal systems represented in these two texts. While it would be beyond the scope of this essay to establish a link between these two stories and medieval French law of the period, I do not mean to employ "law" as merely a figure of speech, or to reduce it to the status of metaphor; for it is the dominant discourse of power in these stories, and it is as such that I reference it here.

From Richard Southern's charting of the "impulse towards individual expression"³ to Colin Morris's notion of the "discovery of the individual,"⁴ the

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individual is a category of analysis of no small interest to medieval studies. In this study, however, I would like to shift focus from the notion of the individual to the subject positions inhabited by Ganelon and Lanval. I hope to discover what they reveal about the configuration of identity in these two medieval narratives. No doubt various explorations of the individual are helpful to this reading. Alan Macfarlane, for example, points out that "individualism" is a word which connotes the quality of being different as compared to other similar entities (for example, nations), and that of difference "at the level of the single person," who is "more important, ultimately, than any larger constituent group."⁵ While Macfarlane's study focuses on developments in rural, non-gentry England, his formulation usefully points to a relational understanding of the individual. Caroline Walker Bynum writes that in the twelfth century, "[a] new sense of self, of inner change and inner choice, is precipitated by the necessity to choose among roles, among groups." She continues, "A new sense of becoming part of a group by conforming one's behavior to an external standard is necessitated by a new awareness of choosing an interior self."⁶ This understanding of the self in relation to the various roles it chooses and does not choose among groups of often conflicting authority, will be key to my reading of the culpable subjectivities of Ganelon and Lanval.

The first of the two trials I will examine takes place in *La Chanson de Roland*, which offers a curious lack of surprise regarding the figure of Ganelon. He is identified as the villain from the outset: "Guenes i vint, ki la traïsun fist / Dés or cumencet le cunseill qu'en mal prist" (178-179; Ganelon arrived, who committed treason/so began the council of woe." The strategy behind this lack of suspense has been discussed at length by critics. It may be part of the formulaic style of the poem, or it may be a concession to a twelfth-century audience familiar with the story. I suggest that perhaps it is deliberate; in revealing in advance how Ganelon will be judged, the author allows the audience to consider his guilt. Knowing the direction in which the plot will turn, one can turn attention to how it is that the plot turns and ask if Ganelon is really so villainous and Roland really so heroic. This opening up of space for questioning might reflect an anxiety about facile determinations of hero and villain, good and bad, innocent and guilty.

In a presage of his eventual defense, Ganelon proclaims his enmity for Roland:

E dit al cunte: "Jo ne vus aim nient:
 Sur mei avez turnét fals jugement.
 Dreiz emperere, vëez mei en present:
 Ademplier voeill vostre comandement. " (306-9)

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[And he said to the count, "I have no love for you. You have brought onto me an unjust choice. My just emperor, here I am before you, ready to carry out your commandment."]

This declaration demonstrates that Ganelon is divided between Roland and Charlemagne, between his allegiance for one and his enmity for the other. This split sentiment will prove vital later, for his action against Roland--setting the Saracen army against Roland's rear guard, separated from the rest of Charlemagne's army--will be construed as an action against Charlemagne and therefore treasonous. Ganelon not only declaims a lack of love for Roland but declares his hatred for him, for Olivier, and for the twelve Pairs. He thus prepares his later defense: "Desfi les ci, sire, vostre veiant" (326; "I disavow them, sire, in your presence"). It is noteworthy that every part of Ganelon's defense will consist of comments made before the crime was committed. This suggests, perhaps, that Ganelon was very careful, but more concretely reveals a narrative strategy suggesting that the categories hero and villain, innocent and guilty, were not as clear-cut as one might initially believe.

After the battles, the narrative returns to domestic matters: the barons are summoned, and the trial begins. Ganelon is in chains, and the verdict is rendered in his description before the trial is concluded: "Dés or cumencet le plait e les noveles / De Guenelun, ki traïsun ad faite" (3747-48; "So begins the trial, and the troubles of Ganelon, who committed treason"). While "innocent before proven guilty" is a phrase consonant with the present time, this description of Ganelon's trial reveals a very different notion of justice. Here, guilt is assumed, and innocence is what must be proven. This strategy of marking Ganelon in advance creates room to consider whether he is indeed *traître*. When this marking is coupled with Ganelon's defense, also prepared for in advance, the narrative presents us with a unique problem: what is a guilty subject? If accusation alone can create culpability, what possibilities, what safeguards, are there for self-defense? It would appear that Ganelon has thought of at least one safeguard. By proclaiming his intent and motive for action before he even acts, he establishes a defense based on intentionality, a defense spoken before a charge is levied.

Ganelon is described in the stock manner reserved for pagans: "S'il fust leials, ben resembblast barun" (3764; "If he had been loyal, he would have resembled a noble"). Pagans are curiously figured in this text; as has often been remarked, they are described as almost Christian, almost noble, almost *preux*, but for the fact of their pagan status. Their military and social structures seem parallel to those of the Franks, suggesting that perhaps what is wrong with the pagans is that they are not different enough, and that *this* is what causes anxiety. If the enemy seems not so different

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after all, wherein resides their enemy quality? The fact that they are identified as pagans is sufficient for marking them as enemies. Thus branding Ganelon as one who commits "traïsun" is sufficient reason to believe that he is a traitor. However the figuration of the pagans is read, at the very least it is revealing of the ability of this narrative, situated in its particular culture and moment, to conceive of and represent difference. It is also revealing of the limits of this conceptual ability. That this figuration is extended to Ganelon suggests the uncertain status of the criminal: he seems at once the "enemy within"⁷ and an "external enemy."⁸ He is the insider who disquietingly resembles the pagans and who exchanges his status with his criminal act, becoming the enemy who is all too familiar, all too similar.

What exactly are the processes for determining guilt in this story? As we have seen, Ganelon's identity is marked in advance, and in Charlemagne's formal accusation of him, the germs of what might be understood as a culpable subjectivity take shape:

"Seignors barons," ço dist Carles li reis,
 "De Guenelun car me jugez le dreit!
 Il fut en l'ost tresqu'en Espagne od mei,

Si me tolit vint mil de mes Franceis,
 E mun nevoid, que jamais ne verreiz,
 E Oliver, li proz e li curteis;
 Les duze pers ad traït por aveir. " (3750-56)

("Lord barons," speaks king Charlemagne, "judge Ganelon according to the law! He was in the army against me as far as Spain, so he took away from me 20,000 of my Franks, and my nephew, whom you will never see again, and Oliver, valiant and courtly; he betrayed the 12 companions for gain.")

For Charlemagne, treason consists of siding with another against group the king, depriving the king of his valued men, and betraying the king's favorites for personal gain. However, in his defense, Ganelon fashions a different conception of culpability:

Dist Ganelon: "Fel seie se jo l'ceil!
 Rollant forfist en or e en aveir,
 Pur que jo quis sa mort e sun destreit;
 Mais traïsun nule nen i otrei." (3757-3760)

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[Ganelon says: "I am a traitor if I hide it! Roland erred in wealth and possession, and for this I sought his death and destruction; but I never committed any treason."]

Ganelon asserts further: "Serveie le par feid e par amur" (3770; "I served [Charlemagne] with faith and with love") and "Vengét m'en sui, mais n'i ad traïsun" (3778; "I avenged myself on [Roland], but I did not commit treason"). Ganelon does not deny that he sought Roland's death and even provides reasons for his actions. But because his vengeance was personal and not directed at Charlemagne, he claims that it was not treasonous.

At this point Charlemagne's barons urge that the trial be set aside, and that Ganelon be exonerated. Roland is dead and done is done, and to engage in combat over this matter would be "*fols*," senseless. This is not what Charlemagne wants to hear, and he calls the barons themselves "*felun*" (3814). Here the accusation is cast, but the crime is not enunciated; does this indicate that "felon" was a label that carried little weight, or rather that all those going against the ruler's wishes, all those sympathetic to the accused, become similarly accusable? It is at this point that Thierry provides Charlemagne with the critical twist that allows Ganelon to be deemed a traitor:

"Que que Rollant Guenelun forsfesist,
 Vostre servise l'en doüst bien guarir.
 Guenes est fels d'iço qu'il le traït,
 Vers vos s'en est parjurez e malmis" (3827-30)

("...whether Roland did or did not transgress against Ganelon, in your service, [Ganelon] ought to have protected [Roland]. Ganelon is a felon because he betrayed [Roland], he perjures and causes you harm.")

Thierry suggests that respect due to the person of Charlemagne is extended to Roland, who acts in the emperor's service. This extension of personhood reveals a model of subjectivity that seems more like intersubjectivity, in that it is shared, both in symbolic representation and in bearing affront. If injury to the person of Roland, representing Charlemagne, is construed as damage to Charlemagne himself, notions of individual subjectivity seem necessarily muddled. Ganelon, too, is in service of the emperor; why is the symbolic extension of the emperor's status extended to Roland but not to him? Perhaps the extension is due to Roland's favored status, or perhaps Ganelon, having acted out of personal interest, forfeits his insider status. In either case, his action, taken on his own behalf, escapes

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the intersubjective, symbolic royal extension, and is not protected from accusation.

This intersubjectivity is also at play in the treatment of Ganelon's *parenz*. When Thierry wins the combat and

Ganelon is hanged, a decision is made: "Hom ki traïst, sei ocit e altroi" (3959; "The man who betrays, brings death on himself and others"). Thirty *parenz* (3781) accompany Ganelon to trial, but it is unclear who they are. They are likely related to Ganelon, but they could also be members of his household, or supporters: "Pur Guenelun erent a plait venuz." (3949; "They came to the trial for Ganelon").¹⁰ What is vital here is that, just as the respect due the emperor was extended to respect for those in his service, punishment of the traitor extends to those in *his* service. While the implication of the *parenz* in Ganelon's punishment might be explained by the notion of blood guilt, I think it is more fruitful to consider their implication with Ganelon's guilt as analogous to the implication of Charlemagne's injury with Roland's. In the categories of injury and guilt, identity is intersubjective, shared along lines of *parenté*, sanguinity, agreement, and community. Ganelon, however, insists on the individual--and it is perhaps this claim that most marks him as culpable. In a political system in which lines of identity overlap and are fluid, Ganelon actions on his own personal interest mark him, as does his betrayal, as culpable.

To the extent that the notion of subjectivity is itself a difficult terrain to navigate, intersubjectivity must seem doubly so. However, in using this term as an analytic tool, I mean to indicate a way of understanding these characters that is not only relational, but also specifically dependent. The subject position of favored vassal inhabited by Roland is inseparable from its dependence on Charlemagne's subject position as powerful sovereign. Therefore, when Ganelon acts in his own self-interest, he ruptures the unity of this intersubjectivity, and paves a route to agency through accessing an individual subject position. Ganelon asserts a notion of injury limited to the individual directly harmed. He chooses to occupy the subject position of an avenger who kills, but he is not wholly outside the law, for he is brought to trial within it. Yet he is figured as a Saracen, an outsider who is yet inside; he is, thus, a truly liminal figure. Although Ganelon is killed, in his insistence on an individual notion of injury, and his right to his own defense in terms reasonable to himself, he promotes a notion of individual subjectivity, breaking away from the group, shared, extended subjectivity. His peers do not even address his defense. This suggests that they reject it, that what the accused has to say in his own defense is irrelevant, or perhaps that they are unable or unwilling to treat openly the issues introduced by such a defense. Whatever the case, the failure of Ganelon's defense suggests that an individual subjectivity is necessarily implicated with a culpable subjectivity.

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Turning to Marie de France's "Lanval," we find an the outsider knight who is forgotten by the king in the distribution of lands and women. It is said of Lanval that "ne nuls des soens bien ne li tint" (20; "no one takes his part"), and the problem again is with the liminal figure who is neither fully within nor fully outside the law. As Marie writes, "huem estranges, descunseilliez / mult est dolenz en altre terre, / quant il ne set u seurs querre" (36-38; "a foreign man, with no counsel / suffers greatly in another land when he knows not where to turn for help"). Lanval is alone, with no one to speak for him--no kin-group, no community, and no means to redress his grievance. When the lady arrives, the situation reads, as R. Howard Bloch notes, "almost as a parody of the damsel in distress rescued by the valiant knight."¹¹ The opening lines of her offer to Lanval can be seen as a vindication of his later defense and an assertion of the exemplarity of their love: "Se vus estes pruz e curteis, / emperere ne quens ne reis/ n'ot unkes tant joie ne bien" (113-15; "If you are valiant and courtly, neither emperor nor count nor king will ever have the joy you hold"). As is the case with Ganelon in *La Chanson de Roland*, this passage offers a foreshadowing of later defense; here it is provided by the unnamed lady. The relationship between Lanval and the lady is contractual, and its commencement parallels fealty-swearing between a noble and his vassal. She offers terms, he accepts, she gives him a gift, they swear allegiance, embrace, and seal their agreement over a meal. She does what Arthur the king does not, thereby inserting an alternative or parallel jurisdiction. Lanval returns to the king's community and he, in turn, is enabled to do what Arthur neglects to do, which is to distribute largesse. In a very tangible way, the lady supplants the king, introducing a parallel jurisdiction, which scripts a competing intersubjectivity. Again, in speaking of intersubjectivity, I do not simply mean relationality; I mean instead to indicate a situation in which a subject is defined in relation and in concert with another. The status of this subject depends on its inseparability from another, dominant subject; in this case, these dominant subject are the king and the lady.

Lanval's wants are supplied by the lady: once he was neglected, alone, a foreigner; now he is cared for and has a lady who appears at his bidding. His subjectivity is coded as an individual one, marked by neglect and lack, and grounded in his economic situation.¹² When Arthur's unnamed queen makes advances toward Lanval, he refuses in language resonating with that of his later defense; in refusing her love, he refuses the position of traitor:

"Lungement ai servi le rei,
ne li vueil pas mentir ma fei.
Ja pur vus ne pur vostre amur
ne mesferai a mun seignur!" (273-76)

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("Long have I served the king, I do not wish to perjure my faith. Neither for you nor for your love would I act against my lord!")

Angered, the queen accuses Lanval of being interested in men, not women, to which Lanval replies that he loves and is loved by a woman superior to any other, and whose lowliest serving girl is worth more than the queen in respect to beauty and numerous other person qualities.

Recall that the queen accuses Lanval of attempted seduction after he refuses her advances. His defense reads:

Lanval defent la deshonor
et la hunte de sun seignur
de mot en mot si cum il dist,
que la reïne ne requist;
mes de ceo dunt il ot parlé
reconut il la verité,
de l'amur dunt il se vanta;
dolenz en est, perdue l'a. (373-80)

(Lanval defends himself against the dishonor and the shame of his lord, word for word just as he spoke, that he never sought out the queen, but regarding the words he spoke he recognized the truth, that he had boasted of his love, and he regrets it, for because of it he lost her.)

He denies having solicited love from the queen, and admits and repents his boast, not because it was untrue or because by it he insulted the queen, but because by it he lost his *amie*. Like Ganelon, Lanval admits to part of the charge, but insists on innocence in his own terms. The last part of his defense is curious, for it reaffirms the original insult which got him in trouble--namely, that his lady is fairer than the queen--and he regrets it for reasons of self-interest alone.

Lanval is accused of a *mesdire*, a misspeaking; what, then, is the basis for the accusation against him? He is accused of making advances toward the queen, insulting her, and boasting that his lover is better-looking. It is questionable whether these charges stand on the basis of injury to the queen alone. Arthur takes up her case, but this could be because of women's limited room for maneuver in the medieval legal system. Lanval's actions are classified as misspeaking and felony; as felony had to do with breaches of feudal oath and conduct, there seems to be a Guinevere-Arthur extension, similar to the Roland-Charlemagne extension, and in contrast with Lanval's treatment and action as an individual subject. On the basis of

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past honor, the peers decide to exonerate Lanval; it would seem that his former good deeds cancel out the accusation of the queen.¹³ In contrast to Ganelon situation, intention counts in Lanval's defense and in the determination of his culpability.

Lanval's trial is continually interrupted--by his inability to produce his lady, by the arrival of the lady's attendants, and finally by the arrival of the lady herself. She is described in terms of the women associated with Aeneas, his mother, lover, and second wife, with whom he reputedly founded Rome. While the influence of classical literature and of Virgil in particular in the Middle Ages is of no small moment, it is significant that allusion is made to Aeneas, for the lady and Lanval are outsiders who at the end of the *lai* disappear to another realm, possibly to carry out the alternative jurisdiction she introduces. Here, however, the lady, and not the male protagonist, is the founder of the new order, capable of interrupting and escaping Arthur's court. The force and form of the lady's testimony implies her equal

footing with Arthur:

"Artur," fet ele, "entent a mei,
e cist barun que jeo ci vei!
Jeo ai amé un tuen vassal.
Veez le ci! Ceo est Lanval!
Achaisunez fu en ta curt
(ne vueil mie qu'a mal li turt)
de ceo qu'il dist. Ceo saces tu
que la reine a tort eü:
unkes nul jur ne la requist.
De la vantance que il fist,
se par mei puet estre aquitez,
par voz baruns seit delivrez!" (631-42)

(" Arthur," she says, "hear me, and these barons whom I see here! I loved one of your vassals. There he is! It is Lanval! He was accused in your court [I do not wish that he come to harm] for what he had said. Know this, that the queen was wrong: he never sought her out. As for his boasting, if he can be acquitted by me, let him be delivered by your barons!")

Who gets to address the king in such a peremptory manner, not only addressing him by first name, but exclaiming it as her first utterance? It was Lanval's words that got him into trouble: he boasted and defended, was charged with felony and *mesdire*, and he is now mute, defended by the proclamation of a sovereign rivaling the king. The lady not only sup-

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plies the functions omitted by Arthur but also has sufficient force to interrupt his legal system, and addresses him familiarly and commandingly to boot. Given that the twelfth century was a time of overlapping jurisdictions, customary law, canon law, ecclesiastic and monastic courts, and a time rich in literary representations and numerous trial narratives, the parallel order introduced by the lady is emblematic of the non-unitary status of the medieval legal system. It suggests an anxious relation the legal system inhabited in relation to its subjects in these texts.

With Lanval we are in realm of discourse; in the trial, however, the lady employs a combination of *parole* and *geste*, with her testimony and with her body, when her physical presence is all that is required. Sharon Kinoshita suggests that the lady's "declaration of his innocence is less important than her appearance itself, for her unsurpassable beauty immediately vindicates his boast." ¹⁴ It is significant, however, that she does not supply her presence alone but employs both her presence and her verbal testimony. Instead of a *judicium dei*, "Lanval" supplies a supernatural, marvelous apparition, the force of whose presence and testimony speaks to the inadequacy of law to determine truth when two parties are opposed, and its inadequacy in matching categories to crimes. The lady's success reinforces the possibility of multiple, alternative jurisdictions, challenging the dominant legal system. That she nevertheless does participate in the trial suggests that the dominant system is not undone by the marvelous system, but must seriously be called into question when rival sovereigns and jurisdictions can exist and find ways out of it.

This escaping is what is enabled by a culpable subjectivity. Ganelon and Lanval are characters acting in their self-interest. When accused of wrongdoing, they defend themselves according to their intention, in their own terms. This starkly individualistic subject position seems to have no place in the world constructed by these texts. Ganelon's champion loses the *judicium dei*, and, forsaken by the god of that world, he is killed. Lanval has a better fate, for his champion arrives to support his claim and is empowered to carry him away. That neither character can remain in his world, within the categories of its social and legal system, suggests that the culpable subject position is one of difference, possibility, and escape.

Both Ganelon and Lanval defend themselves, denying charges of treason and felony. That they admit to some portion of wrongdoing implicitly critiques the capacity of legal categories to encompass adequately crimes and their doers. This avowal of partial guilt functions as a kind of legal confession--a confessing of intent and deed in exchange

for absolution. The defense of each knight rests on the fact that his actions are reasonable to himself. Significantly, each judges himself based on his own authority to interpret his deeds. That they seem to be judged, however, on the basis of the consequence and not the intent of their actions indicates that the

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legal system is not yet ready to include an attention to interiority held to be common in this period.¹⁵ John Benton examines forms of individuation in this period and writes of the change in medieval Europe from being a "shame" culture to a "guilt" culture as linked to this individualization, while noting the danger in "the uncritical use" of such terms.¹⁶ He writes that in the twelfth century "intention--the choices and desires of the conscious self independent of specific actions--again became a central issue"¹⁷ While the communities represented in these texts are not prepared to address this issue openly, the lack of attention to individualization and intention in the trials of Ganelon and Lanval, given the defendants' insistence on them, suggests the danger that such an acknowledgement would bring. Bynum asserts that the twelfth century "discovered" the self as well as the group;¹⁸ although she writes of a religious context, in light of her formulation Ganelon and Lanval might be understood as individual subjects, aware of their choices and the attendant implications within the context of the various groups with which they might be affiliated.

In addition to revealing a high degree of self-awareness, the defenses of Ganelon and Lanval provide a nuanced understanding of their culpable subjectivities. Their defenses function in a way as legal autobiography, for, in his defense, each performs a self-representation, a narrative of his deeds, his intentions, and how he understands them. Ganelon's defense calls for a delimiting of injury to individuals alone, implying an individual subjectivity, inflicting injury and bearing guilt, alone. He seems to have the barons convinced, save for Thierry, who reaffirms the shared nature of injury and, by extension, of subjectivity. This shared subjectivity, or intersubjectivity, is reinforced by the hanging of Ganelon's thirty *parenz*; as injury is shared, communal, so is guilt, which bleeds onto those who ally themselves. With Lanval, that we are in a universe of iteration, of utterance, is highlighted by his defining moments: his promise and his boast. For his character, utterance--and, by extension, its lack--are everything. He, too, engages in a sort of plea-bargaining, negotiating the terms of his guilt, and is fortunate to have in the place of Thierry a saving lady, who intervenes with a parallel jurisdiction, providing a way out of the inadequacies of Arthur's legal system.

Ganelon and Lanval provide models of a culpable, self-interpellating subject,¹⁹ each calling into existence his own subjectivity, assessing his intentions and guilt in his own terms. Ganelon elects and defends his culpable subject position, although he must know how his action will be construed by his community. Lanval is goaded into blurting out the truth; while he insists on his innocence and guilt in his own terms, the court is unable to find him innocent. The lady arrives and defends him, and together they leave. His abandonment of the court leaves his status suspended in guilt; he abandons the system before the barons can render a

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verdict. Ganelon is found guilty and is killed, while Lanval would seem to be proven innocent, but must nevertheless escape. This model provides a contrast to that of an institutionally interpellated subject who is subject to classifications and crimes which do not satisfactorily fit him, his actions, and his intentions. Both are figured liminally as outsiders--Ganelon by his association with the Saracens and by the classification of his crime, and Lanval by his foreign birth and his association with the other-worldly lady. These figurations reveal the thorny relationship between the law and those who are neither fully within nor fully outside its jurisdiction. That this liminal status can be elective provides substantial scope for individual subjectivity and agency. These two trial narratives display a troubled working out of what it means to be a culpable subject, and suggest that a liminal subject position, which can be chosen, might be an ideal place for a notion of an individual subjectivity to arise. This is an individual subject position, however, which has but two options in these texts: either to escape, or to be destroyed.

Notes

1. *La Chanson de Roland*, ed. and trans. Ian Short, Librairie générale française (Paris, 1990), p. 38, l. 178: "Guenes i vint, ki la traïsun fist." Subsequent references to this edition are given by line number in the text.
2. Marie de France, "Lanval," *Lais de Marie de France*, ed. Karl Warnke, trans. Laurence Harf-Lancner (Paris, 1990), p. 156, ll. 439-441, "Li reis parla vers sun vassal, / que jo vus oi numer Lanval; / de felunie le reta / e d'un mesdit l'achaisuna." Subsequent references to these texts are given by line numbers in the text.
3. Richard Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (New Haven, 1953), pp. 221-22.
4. Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual: 1050-1200* (Toronto, 1987).
5. Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism* (Oxford, 1978), p. 5.
6. Caroline Walker Bynum, *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (Berkeley, 1982), p. 107.
7. Emanuel J. Mickel, Jr., "Judicium Dei and the Structure of La Chanson de Roland," in *Studies in Honor of Hans-Erich Keller: Medieval French and Occitan Literature and Romance Linguistics*, ed. Rupert T. Pickens (Kalamazoo, 1993), p. 45.
8. Ganelon and Marsile "were both external enemies in the sense that they were outside the pale of society, and the opprobrious word 'felon' was applied indifferently to each." Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages*, p. 243.
9. Roland is Charlemagne's nephew and either Ganelon's step-son or son-in-law. Ganelon is Roland's *parastre*, which would seem to imply kinship between Ganelon and Charlemagne. In any case, it is ultimately Roland's service and not his kinship that is emphasized in the charge against Ganelon.

10. John Halverson writes that their hanging "was very far from customary," and that "what we may have in this moment of zeal is a kind of symbolic damning of the whole idea and existence of the kin group as a political force." See Halverson, "Ganelon's Trial," *Speculum* 42 (1967), 688.
11. R. Howard Bloch, "New Philology and Old French," *Speculum* 65 (1990), 50.
12. Lanval is representative of the "lower nobility" of younger, unmarried sons; see Eric Köhler, quoted by Bloch, "New Philology and Old French," pp. 49.
13. "Un sairement l'en guagera, / e li reis le nus pardurra. / E s'il puet avoir sun garant / e s'amie venist avant / e ceo fust veirs que il en dist, / dunt la reïne se marrist, / de ceo avra il bien merci, / quant pur vilté nel dist de li" (451-58). "He will pledge an oath, and the king will leave it to us. And if he can produce his guarantee and if his lady will arrive, and if there is truth in what he spoke, which so angered the queen, he will have mercy, for he did not speak out of disdain."
14. Sharon Kinoshita, "Cherchez La Femme: Feminist Criticism and Marie de France's *Lai de Lanval*," *Romance Notes* 34 (1994), 272.
15. David Aers writes on this "inward" turning phenomenon, tracing it from Augustine forward, in "A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists," *Culture and History 1350-1600: Essays on English Communities, Identities, and Writing*, ed. David Aers (Detroit, 1992), pp. 181-84.
16. John F. Benton, "Consciousness of Self and Perceptions of Individuality," in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson and Giles Constable, with Carol D. Lanham (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 271-87.
17. Benton, "Consciousness of Self," pp. 272-73.
18. Bynum, *Jesus as Mother*, p. 106-9.
19. In this paper, I have considered only male subjectivity, by accident of the texts I examined; to bring in the issue of gender would necessarily complicate the matter, as a discussion of female agency in the Middle Ages would necessarily differ from one of male agency.